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the attention of
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paid to conventional defense strategy.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Defending oneself against potential enemies has always
been and always will be one of the most important aspects of
survival.
prepare

Once a threat has been recognized,
adequately

consequences.

for

that

threat

Th is thesis is concerned

failure to

invites

its

worst

with the defensive

preparation for one of the most widely recognized threats in
the

world--the

threat

of

Soviet

domination

of

Western

Europe.
Of course the threat to Western Europe is not limited
to military invasion.

There are many complex

contribute to the overall danger.
intimidation,
espionage.

factors

that

Among them are political

economic suffocation and industrial/political

H~wever,

military threat.

It

these threats all originate from the
is

the

military threat

to Western

Europe that is the most apparent and would have the most
immediate consequences in the region.

The scope of the

thesis will therefore be limited to the military threat to
Western Europe.
The military threat, however, is also very complex.

In

pondering defensive preparation to meet the military threat,
some of the questions that readily come to mind are:
might cause the outbreak of hostilities?

What

If armed conflict

2

were

to

begin,

battlefield?

what

What

tactics

role

should

should

be

nuclear,

used

on

biological

the
or

chemical weapons play and what naval strategy should be
used?

Since each of these questions could be the subject of

a separate study, this thesis will focus on conventional
battlefield strategy.
Although we live in a time in which strategies using
nuclear
analysts,

weapons dominate the attention of

most defense

there is an increasing number of reasons why more

attention should be paid

to conventional defense strategy.

These include:
1)

the need

to

improve

NATO conventional forces,

which has been labeled as moral and practical by
virtually every reputable commission, study or
authority in recent years; 1
2)

the suspicion that the Soviets have been planning
for

potential

nonnuclear

(conventional)

armed

conflict in Europe since the early 1970's; 2
3)

the fact that NATO policy makers are now giving
serious consideration to

the possibility of

1

Robert B. Killebrew, Conventional Defense and Total
Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options (Wilmington,
Delaware:
Scholarly Resources, 1986), p. 7.
2

Graham D. Vernon, Soviet Options for War in Europe:
Nuclear or Conventional? (Washington, D.C.:
National
Defense University, 1979), pp. 14-15.

3

fighting battles similar to those of World War II
which were entirely conventional in nature; 3
4)

the desire to maintain a conventional strategy so
as to offer an alternative to the possibility of a
nuclear stalemate or nuclear holocaust;

5)

the concern that,
parity or

since the Soviets have achieved

superiority vis-a-vis

the

U.S.

in

virtually every category of nuclear weapon, the
threat

to escalate

to

nuclear

weapons

as

a

deterrent in armed conflict is much less credible
today; 4
6)

the recognition that, as public abhorrence for the
use of nuclear

weapons

increases,

the

importance

of conventional weapon strategy as part of the

3

Ibid.

4
Waldo D. Freeman, NATO Central Re ion Forward Defense:
Correcting the Strategy Force Mismatch (Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University, 1981), p. l; Killebrew, op.
cit., p. 1.

4

overall deterrent

strategy

has

also

increased

significantly;S
7)

the belief that the Soviets know that conventional
superiority would allow them to intimidate Western
Europe politically;6 and

8)

the expectation that if the Soviets did achieve
over whelming conventional superiority,

war

would

become much more likely since war is most likely
to occur when one side believes a quick victory is
possible. 7
These

reasons

reveal

the

importance

of

writing

on

conventional battlefield strategy.
The intent of the strategy discussed here,
perceived by a potential adversary to
capable of inflicting unacceptable losses,
adversary from initiating armed conflict.
remains for defense planners is:
5

be

if it is

effective and

is to deter that
The question that

What is the most effective

Phillip R. Lindner, "Consideration of a Conventional
Defense of Central Europe," in Conventional Deterrence:
Alternatives for European Defen~e, James R. Golden, Asa A.
Clark, Bruce E. Arlinghaus, eds. (Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1984), p. 109; Vernon, op. cit., pp. 15-16;
Helmut Schmidt, The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture
Survival, 20 (Jan.-Feb. 1978), 2-10; see also the annual
Posture Statements of the secretaries of defense of the
United States since the early 1960's as noted ·in John J.
Mearsheimer, conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 213.
6

Killebrew, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

7

Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 24.

5

strategy for maintaining deterrence and,
is

the

most

effective

hostilities commence?

strategy

to

failing that,

what

ensure victory

if

The purpose of this thesis is thus to

identify and examine NATO battlefield strategy so that the
reader can be in a

position to evaluate

it.

This

is

significant because the lives of every citizen of the free
world, as well as the lives of others, are affected either
directly or indirectly by the ability of NATO to defend its
members.
Having identified the purpose of this study,

it is now

necessary to outline what will be accomplished by the time
the

thesis

is

completed.

The

introductory

chapter

illustrates the organization of the thesis and defines some
of the pertinent terms

to be

used.

The second chapter

briefly discusses the history of NATO.
arranged

into

four

main

sections.

This chapter

The

first

of

is

these

describes the events leading up to the formation of the NATO
alliance.

The second section focuses on the early issue of

German rearmament and is divided into two subsections:
the

Korean

Community,

War

as

and 2)

a

catalyst and

the

European

1)

Defense

the formation of the Western European

Union as an alternative to the European Defense Community.
The

third section

in

this chapter

discusses

the

French

withdrawal from the integrated military command structure of
NATO in the 1960's, the reasons for the withdrawal and the

6

effect it had on the overall NATO defensive strategy.

The

final

the

section

in

this

chapter

present day features of NATO.

illuminates

some of

Specifics in this section

will examine the organizational structure of NATO and the
methods used for resolving political and military conflict.
The

third

chapter

battlefield strategy.
reviews

the

strategy.

of

the

thesis

examines

NATO

The first section within this chapter

history of NATO conventional battlefield

The two main NATO battlefield strategies that

predated today's forward defense strategy are discussed.
The second section within this chapter explores the current
strategy.

This section has a subsection on NATO battlefield

tactics, and a subsection on NATO air/ground interdiction.
The

subsection on air/ground

interdiction outlines

the

concept of Follow-on Forces Attack and how it relates to the
overall implementation of Forward Defense.
The fourth chapter illuminates major factors in Forward
· Defense.

The first section examines factors that complement

the strategy.

There are six subsections in this section.

They include:

1) terrain (natural barriers), 2) man-made

barriers,

3)

force-to-space

ratios,

exchange rates, and 5) command style.

4)

attrition and

The second section of

this chapter examines factors that affect the implementation
of

Forward

Defense.

subsection on
subsection on

the
the

The discussion

scenario of

a

here

surprise

NATO decision on

includes a

attack

and

a

mobilization and

7

reinforcement.

The final chapter summarizes the work and

provides some military and political conclusions.
Before proceeding with the main body of this work, it
is necessary to define some of the terms that will be used.
ACE--

Allied Command

Europe.

The

ACE

jurisdiction includes the area from
the

Nor th Cape of

Nor way

to

the

Mediterranean Sea and from the
eastern

border

of

Turkey

to

the

Atlantic Ocean excluding the United
Kingdom and Portugal.

ACE includes

five subordinate commands:

AFCENT,

AFNORTH, AFSOUTH, UKAIR, and AMF.
ACE is one of three major regional
commands within NATO.a
AFC ENT--

Allied Forces of Central Europe.
The countries that assign forces to
AFCENT

are:

Luxembourg,

Belgium,

Canada,

the Netherlands,

the

United Kingdom, the United States
and

West

Germany.

The

AFCENT

8
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook
(Brussels:
NATO Information Service, 1985), p. 37; Gregory
R. Copley and Clifford M. Weiss, eds., Defense and Foreign
Affairs Handbook, 1985 ed. (Washington, D.C.:
Perth
corporation-;-1985), p. 83 7.

8

command

is

responsible

for

defending the NATO area between the
Elbe River in northern West Germany
to the Austrian and Swiss borders.
AFCENT

has

NORTHAG

two

and

CENTAG

headquartered
Netherlands. 9

subdivisions:

at

and

is

Brunssum,

The thesis is mainly

concerned with this geographical
area.
AFNORTH--

Allied Forces of Northern Europe.
The AFNORTH command is responsible
for defending Norway, Denmark, West
Germany north of the Elbe River and
the approaches to the Baltic Sea.
AFNORTH
Kolsaas,

AFSOUTH--

is

headquartered

in

Norway.lo

Allied Forces of Southern Europe.
The AFSOUTH command is responsible
for defending
Turkey.

Italy,

In addition,

States Sixth Fleet,

Greece and
the United
which

under the AFSOUTH command,
9

Copley, loc. cit., p. 837.

10

Ibid.

falls

is also

9

responsible

for

defending

the

communications and supply lines in
the Mediterranean Sea and the Black
Sea territorial waters of Turkey.
AFSOUTH
Bagnoli,
AMF--

ACE

is

headquartered

in

Italy .11

Mobile

Force.

AMF

is

a

relatively small multinational
force

designed

primarily

in

for

the

operations

northern

southern NATO flanks.

and

The AMF is

highly mobile and can be deployed
rapidly in any area of ACE.

It is

headquartered in Sechenheim, West
Germany. 12
Battlefield--

John

Mearsheimer,

defense analyst,
as an area
armies
and,

"on

directly

a

renowned

defined this term
which
face

two

large

each

other

if war breaks out, directly

engage each other in a relatively

11

Ibid.

12

Ibid.; NATO Handbook, loc. cit.

10
large amount of space. 1113

In

thesis,

to

the

term refers

this
the

modern battlefield in which armored
vehicles such as tanks dominate the
scene.

It excludes armed conflict

in which guerrilla warfare or naval
and air

warfare dominate.

Air

warfare is included as a part of
the battlefield strategy but does
not dominate it.14
CENT AG--

Central Army

Group.

One of

two

subdivisions of AFCENT.
Conventional Weapons--

Any

weapon

that

biological,

is

not

chemical

nuclear,
or

space

based.
Deterrence--

Mearsheimer
"persuading

defines

this

an opponent

not

as
to

initiate a specific action because
the

perceived

justify
risks. 1115

the

benefits

estimated
In

this

do

not

costs

and

thesis

it

applies to persuading a potential
13

Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 15.

14

Ibid.

15

Ibid., p. 14.

11

adversary

not

to

initiate

armed

conflict with NATO members because
the

costs

of

doing

so

would

outweigh the benefits.
Doctrine--

According to Ted Schroeder, a noted
military
series

author,
of

doctrine

simple

is

"a

universal

principles of warfare embodied in a
set of

human beliefs. 111 6

strategy,

Unlike

with which it is often

confused, doctrine only describes
behavior, it does not urge people
how to act. 17
NATO--

North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NO RT HAG--

Northern Army Group.

One of two

subdivisions of AFCENT.
SACEUR--

Supreme Allied Commander of Europe.
The

current

SACEUR

Rogers. 18

Bernard

w.

always

an American

commands ACE.

is

General

The SACEUR is
officer.

He

The commanders-in-

16
Ted Schroeder, "Doctrine and Strategy: The Misunderstood Basics," Military Review, 66 (May 1986), p. 13.
17

Ibid., p. 14.

18

NATO Handbook, op. cit., p. 9.

12

chief of all five ACE sub-commands
{AFNORTH, AFCENT, AFSOUTH, UKAIR,
and

AMF)

SAC EUR.

report

directly

In addition,

to

the

the SACEUR

commands the Allied Tactical Air
Forces and

the

integrated NATO

staff at SHAPE.19
SHAPE--

Supreme Headquarters of the Allied
Powers

of

Europe.

SHAPE

headquarters of ACE and

is

the

is located

at Casteau, Belgium. 2 0
Strategy--

Strategy as

it applies

to

this

thesis is the plan of action for
large

scale combat operations.

According to Schroeder, "strategy
is

a

set

of

interconnected

statements" about deployment and
employment of military forces. 2 1
UKAIR--

The

United

Kingdom Air

Forces.

UKAIR is always commanded by a
British

19

Copley, loc. cit.

20

Ibid.

21

Schroeder, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

Air

Officer

and

is

13
headquartered at High Wycombe,
Its responsibilities include:
and

short

range

maritime support,

22

Copley, loc. cit.

air

UK.
long

support,

conventional

attack,

reconnaissance,

defense,

and nuclear strike.22

air

14
CHAPTER TWO
BRIEF NATO HISTORY

Events That Led To The Treaty
Europe was economically, politically, and militarily
dependent on the United States after World War

II.

The

uneasy alliance between the Western allies and the Soviet
Union had begun to deteriorate only a few months after the
end of the war.

Hostility and suspicion towards the Soviets

were steadily increasing.

The Soviets had begun taking

advantage of a power vacuum in Europe that had been created
at the conclusion of the war as a result of the rapidly
decreasing American presence and the tremendous political
and economic instability that had developed.
military,

Soviet

political and economic pressure on territories it

had occupied in the
widespread

concern

final stages of

over

the

looming

the

war

threat

of

spawned
Soviet

dominance over all of Europe. 23
Ironically, one of the first persons to recognize the
Soviet threat to democratic countries after World War II was
the

ever-optimistic Winston Churchill.

British Prime

Minister

during

the

war,

Churchill,

the

identified

the

23
western
Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence:
Defense in the 1980' s," Foreign Affairs 61 (1983), 310.

15
impending menace of Soviet military superiority over Europe
in a telegram to President Truman on May 12, 1945.
I am profoundly concerned about the European
situation....
Our armies
[are] likely to
undergo a marked reduction .•.•
What will be the position in a year or two when
the British and American Armies have melted and
the French have not yet been formed ••• and when
Rus~ia may.cho~fe to keep 200-300 divisions on
active service?
Churchill's fears were realized when the allies began
to disarm at an alarming rate.

On May 7,

Germany surrendered to the allies,
3,100,000 men under

arms

the day

the United States had

in Europe.

1,321,000 and Canada had 299,000.

1945,

Great Britain had

Within one year,

the

American armeq strength in Europe had eroded to 391,000,
British numbers had declined to 488,000 and the Canadians
had departed completely.

At the same time, the Soviets kept

their armed forces at full strength (about 4-1/2 million
men) and maintained their war materiel production at full
capacity. 25
Fear and anxiety were also enhanced among democratic
countries
European

after

the

territory.

Soviets
These

annexed

large

annexations

amounts

r epr es en ted

of
the

24
Lord Ismay, NATO:
The First Five Years 1949-1954
(Utrecht, Netherlands:
Bosch, 1954), pp.3-4, citing Sir
Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (n.d:
n.p., n.d.) n.
pag.
25

Lord Ismay, op. cit., pp. 4 and 7.

16
subjugation of nearly 25 million people and
miles of land.

200, 632 square

Whole countries such as Lithuania, Latvia

and Estonia were annexed in their entirety.

The Soviets

also annexed the Czechoslovakian region of Subcarpathia,
Romania's Bessarabian region and part of Bukovina, Finland's
Petsamo district and part of the Karelian isthmus, part of
East Prussia, and eastern Poland.26
Another
western

factor

European

contributing to
countries

at

the extreme anxiety of

the

time

was

the

total

dominance that the Soviets were able to establish over all
of eastern Europe.

The Soviets used the continuing presence

of their massive armed forces to intimidate and coerce the
governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Eastern
Germany,

Hungary,

Poland

and

Romania.

This

"conquest

without war" represented the suppression of an additional 87
million non-Russian people with incomes totaling nearly half
of the entire national income of the Soviet Union.

It also

meant that approximately 392,439 more square miles of land
were under Soviet control. 27
More than fear of a direct military attack, the major
concern was that economic and political collapse would soon
make a Soviet military attack unnecessary.

In the wake of

26
Walter Lacquer, Europe Since Hitler:
Europe, 2d rev. ed. (Harrisonburg, Virginia:
and Sons, 1982), p. 22; Ibid., p. 5.

The Rebirth of
R.R. Donnelley

27

Lord Ismay,

loc. cit.

17

World War II,

widespread economic distress had taken place

and the Soviets were moving to exploit the situation.

By

penetrating coalition governments in this environment,

the

Soviets were able
Europe. 28

to gain control over

a

large part of

It became obvious that unless Europe received

tremendous

economic

and

military

aid,

it

would

be

increasingly susceptible to political collapse and Soviet
domination. 29
a

collapse

The American economic effort to prevent such
was

called

the

European

Recovery

Program,

otherwise known as the Marshall Plan.
The Marshall Plan and the Czech Coup
The European Recovery Program was launched in a speech
by Secretary of State and General of the Army,
Marshall, on June 5,

1947. 30

George

c.

The Marshall Plan was a four-

year program in which billions of dollars were granted to
Europe for the purpose of facilitating its economic recovery

28

Sir Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO {London:
Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), xi; Michael Howard, loc.
cit.
29
Phil Williams, "The United States' Commitment to
Western Europe:
Strategic Ambiguity and Political
Disintegration," International Affairs 59 {Spring 1983),
200.
30

Ismay, op. cit., p. 6.

18
from

the

war.31

including
control.

was open to all European countries

the Soviet Union and

the

countries

under

its

Two countries under Soviet control, Poland and

Czechoslovakia,
However,

It

actually sought aid from the Marshall Plan.

the Soviets forbade all countries under

domain from accepting any aid from the Plan.
accepting the American offer,

their

Instead of

they set up the Communist

Information Bureau (COMINFORM) to organize opposition to the
Plan. 32
The Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan is perceived
by many observers as the turning point in the American,
British and
Union.

French governments' policies toward the Soviet

The personal reactions of Soviet officials were so

contemptuous and abusive that Ernest Bevin,
Foreign Secretary,

and Georges Bidault,

the British

the French Foreign

Minister, were led to believe that any future cooperation
with the Soviet Union would be impossible.3 3
this,

Not long after

when the Council of Foreign Ministers (a series of

meetings of the foreign ministers of the four major victors

31
Ernst H. Van Der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic
Partnership (New York:
Elsevier, 1966), pp. 18, 107-108,
166.
32
William Park, Defending the West: A History of NATO
(Boulder, Colorado:
Westview, 1986), p. 5; Sir Nicholas
Henderson, loc. cit.; NATO Handbook, op. cit., p. 70.
33
Baron Robert Rothschild, "Belgium and the Longest
Lasting Alliance," NATO Review, 30 (Feb. 1982), 20.

19
of World War II [the United States, Great Britain, France
and

the

Soviet

Union]

that

was

designed

to

resolve

differences on the fate of Germany) 34 broke up for the last
time

in December of 1947,

Bevin was moved

to say to

Marshall,
I am convinced that the Soviet Union will not deal
with the West on any reasonable terms in the
foreseeable future and that the salvation of the
West depends upon the formation of some form of
union formal or informal in character in Western
Europe, backed by the United States and the
Dominions, such a mobilization of moral and
material forces as will inspire co~~idence and
energy within, and respect elsewhere.
This breakdown of the Council of Ministers came to represent
the

end of cooperation between the

West and the Soviet

Union. 36
Bevin's desire for a union within Western Europe spread
convincingly among more and more European leaders but some
were

still hesitant.

The events of February 25,

1948,

helped persuade remaining doubters about the need for a
union.

On that date,

the Soviet Union instigated a coup

d'etat in Czechoslovakia.

The Communist Party there

34
Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman,
"The Pentagon
Negotiations March 1948:
The Launching of the North
Atlantic Treaty," International Affairs 59 (Summer 1983),
352.
35
Theodore c. Achilles, "US Role in Negotiations that
Part I," NATO Review 27 (Aug.
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36
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overthrew the government and installed a regime that was a
puppet of the Soviet Union.

Soon after the takeover, one of

Czechoslovakia's most respected figures, Foreign Minister
Jan Masaryk, jumped--some say was thrown--from a high-story
building window to his death. 37

The impact of these events

on world opinion was thunderous.

The feeling of the time

was that if the Soviets would do this once,
prevent them from doing it again?

what would

Many felt there was

little a democracy could do to prevent a duplication of
those events in lieu of armed military strength.38
The Brussels Treaty
The first step in the evolution of the solution to this
threat came with the signing of the Brussels Treaty on March
17,

1948.

Many people feel that if it were not for

the

signing of the Brussels Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty
would never have been created.

American policy makers were

reluctant to entangle the United States into any kind of
alliance unless the Europeans first indicated their own
willingness

to cooperate among

themselves. 39

The Brussels

37
Josef Korbel,
The Communist Subversion of
Czechoslovakia 193 8-194 8: -The-Fai1ure-ofcoexfStence_____ _
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 156.
38
Lord Gladwyn, The Memoirs of Lord Gladw.l!! (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p. 213.
39
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Treaty provided that evidence.
real

evidence

of

West

It represented the first

European

interest

in

postwar

cooperation. 40
The most significant part of the Brussels Treaty is the
original Article IV which states:
If any of the High Contracting Parties should be
the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other
High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with
the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all
the mi!f tary and other aid and assistance in their
power.
To

the

United

signatories'

States,
(Great

the

treaty

Britain,

represented

France,

the

five

Belgium,

The

Netherlands and Luxembourg) willingness to commit themselves
to

a

consortium

stability. 42

of

collective

defense

and

internal

President Truman emphasized its importance to

Congress on the very day the treaty was signed:
I am confident that the United States will, by
appropriate means, extend to the free nations the
support which the situation requires. I am sure
that the determination of the free countries of
Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an

40
Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future:
Toward a New
Transatlantic Bargain (Washington;- D.c:-:- National-De-fense
University Press, 1985), p. 3.

41
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Article IV became Article V with the Protocol amendments of
1954.
42

Sloan, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
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equal determinatiof.3 on our part to help them to
protect themselves.
The stage was set for the United States' response to the
European overture.
The Vandenberg Resolution
Probably the most important step in the process of
including

the

United

European countries

States

in

an

alliance

West

was the Uni tea states Senate's adopt ion

of Senate Resolution No. 239 on June 11, 1948.
known as the Vandenberg Resolution,
prinicpal author,

with

Senator Arthur H.

Otherwise

it was named after its
Vandenberg of Michigan,

who was also the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations at the time.

The resolution marked a significant

change in the foreign policy of the United States during
peacetime. 44
was

For the first time, the United States Senate

recommending

and other

that

the

Administration

collective arrangements

for

pursue "regional
individual and

collective self defense," and the "association of the United
States, by constitutional process with such regional and
other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and

43
Harry s. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope:
(New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 279.
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44
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effective self-help and mutual aid." 45
resolution

was

negotiators

to

carefully
form

an

vague,

it

Atlantic

Even though the

paved

the

alliance

way

for

under

the

provisions of the United Nations' Charter. 46
At this point,
alliance
powers,
Iceland,

began

in

negotiations

earnest

the United States,
Italy,

Nor way,

to join the alliance. 4 7

between

to

form

the

and Canada.

an Atlantic

Brussels
Later,

Treaty

Denmark,

and Portugal were formally invited
As negotiations on the wording of

the treaty progressed, it became evident the reasons for
creating the alliance were diverse.
Different Motivations
For

the Americans,

the

alliance

was

seen as

an

opportunity to enhance their strategic capabilities while
simultaneously preventing the vast resources of Europe from
falling under Soviet control.

They realized that a strong

and secure Europe would 1) be a tremendous hedge against
Soviet expansionism and 2) continue to serve as an important
market for American goods. 48

Americans also saw aid to

45
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Facts and
Figures (Brussels:
NATO Information Service, 1981), p. 7.
46

Henrikson, op. cit., p. 17; Ismay, op. cit., p. 9.

47
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48
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Europe as only temporary.

The U.S. hoped that the aid would

allow Europe to regain its former strength and stature so
that eventually Europe would be able to fend for itself with
an absolute minimum of U.S. help. 49
The Europeans saw it differently.

They viewed the

alliance not as a temporary solution but as a means to
ensure American commitment to the region.
particularly

interested

in

securing

Europeans were

the

"umbrella"

of

American strategic nuclear weapons for protection against
the soviet military threat. 50

They wanted the alliance more

as a measure of confidence to offset their own collective
inability to manage any new crisis more than as protection
against a military attack.
blanket

upon

economies.

which

NATO to them was a security

they could

rebuild

their

Europeans felt American presence

shattered

in particular

was needed to stabilize the region. 5 1
Despite their differences, both Europeans and Americans
recognized the mutual benefits of forming an alliance and
did so officially by signing the North Atlantic Treaty on
April 4, 1949, in Washington, D.c. 52

However, differences

49
Simon Lunn, Burden-sharing in NATO (London:
and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. a.
50
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One of

still existed between the U.S. and the Europeans.

the most prominent was the question of how West Germany
would fit into the new alliance.

This will be discussed

under the German Rearmament section.
German Rearmament
The Korean War Catalyst and the European Defense Community
(EDC)
The

outbreak

of

the

Korean

War

in

June of

1950

heightened fears that Western Europe might be the object of
a

Soviet

invasion.

NATO

in

general

and

the

U.S.

in

particular realized that conventional forces in Europe were
inadequate

to

repel

such

an

attack.

President

Truman

decided to deploy a significant number of American troops in
Europe in September 1950. 53

However, the U.S. had a major

military commitment in Korea and was still leery of getting
over-committed in Europe.

So, the Americans began to insist

that Europeans increase their share of the defense burden in
NATO.

The U.S. believed the best way to accomplish this was

through the rearmament of West Germany. 54
demands,
continued

they

1 inked

American

the

rearmament of

economic

aid

that

To back up their
Ger many
Europeans

to

the

still

53
Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European
Community (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 18; Sloan,
op. cit., pp. 10-11.
54

George, loc. cit.
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desperately needed.

Secretary of State Dulles also strongly

hinted that if the Europeans did not contribute more to
their own defense,

the

u.s.

might withdraw some of

its

troops from Europe.SS
Many Europeans, especially the French, could not bear
the

thought

of

a

rearmed

Germany.

The

French

were

particularly sensitive not only because of the long history
they had had as mortal enemies with Germany but also because
of their common border.

The U.S., however, was persistent

in its demands because it saw a

German contribution as

essential to the defense of Europe against Communist forays
from the east. 56
The French responded by proposing

the Pleven Plan,

named after its author, French Prime Minister

Ren~

Plevin.

The Plevin Plan called for a European army to be directed
under a supranational structure including a European
minister of defense responsible to a European assembly.

The

European army was to include West German participation but
without allowing a west German national army.S 7

The Plevin

S5
Ibid.; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of
the United States: Western Europe, Vol. 3 (19SO), p. 498.
56

George, loc. cit.

57
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of Western Germany, 1950-4," International Affairs, 61
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Plan also called for all West German troops to be subject to
the direction of the European army while the other European
countries would have to commit only a
forces. 58

portion of their

The proposal was widely opposed even in France.

The U.S. and West Germany encouraged its approval,

however,

and after the NATO ministerial meeting in Lisbon in February
of 1952, considerable progress had been made towards its
approvai. 59

Subsequent

to a few changes,

the plan was

renamed the European Defense Community (EDC), and was signed
by Belgium, France, West Germany,

Italy, Luxembourg, and the

Netherlands, on May 27, 1952. 60

Ratification, though, was

another

story.

More than a year and a half passed before a single
country ratified the treaty.
in France.

It was especially in trouble

The French were highly suspicious, possibly with

good reason, that under the EDC as it stood then the U.S.
and

Great Britain would

lose

interest

troops stationed on the continent.

in

keeping

their

They feared that French

forces would be left virtually alone to defend against a
rearmed bigger,

stronger Ger man army. 61

Pressure from the

58
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59
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60
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U.S.

to ratify the treaty persisted,

continued

but support for

to erode and it was defeated by the French

National Assembly by almost 2 to 1 in August of 1954. 62
appeared

it

that

until

there

was

some

sort

of

It

British

association with the EDC and a commitment by the U.S. to
keep its troops in Europe,

there could be no solution to the

problem of how to integrate West Germany into the Western
family. 63
The Western European Union (WEU)
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden saw the Brussels
Treaty as a possible solution to the dilemma facing Europe.
A conference was called to meet at London to discuss the
problem of German rearmament;

it was later moved to Par is.

At the conclusion of this conference,

an agreement had been

reached between all concerned parties regarding West German
sovereignty
agreements,

and

rearmament. 64

These

London

and

which were concluded in October of 1954,

the basis for the WEU.

Paris
became

Under the agreements, the Federal

Republic of Germany was granted its sovereignty and the
British, French and U.S. occupation of Germany was ended.
In exchange West Germany agreed to allow foreign military
62

Ibid., pp. 22-25.

63
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64

Warner, op. cit., pp. 285-286.
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forces to be stationed on its territory without reducing
their

size.

The Western Union Defense Organization,

which

was created by the Defense Ministers of the Brussels Treaty,
became the Western European Union while west Germany and
Italy were invited to join the Brussels Treaty as part of
the agreements.

It was also agreed that West Germany would

become a member of NATO but its military would be under the
scrutiny of

the

WEU.

The final part of the agreements

stated that the U.S. and the United Kingdom would commit
military troops on the continent of Europe for as long as
their allies desired. 65

The agreements forming the WEU were

signed in Paris on October 23, 1954, and were ratified by
all seven members (Belgium, France,
Germany,

Italy,

Luxembourg,

Kingdom)

by May 6,

1955,

the Federal Republic of

the Netherlands,

and the United

when it went into effect. 66

It

marked the foundation of the strong European defense that
exists

today.

The new terms of the WEU provided the French with the
guarantees

that

were

the

stumbling

attempts to solve the defense problem.

block

to

previous

All members of the

WEU are bound by treaty to automatic military and other aid

65
s tanley R. Sloan, "European Co-operation and the
Future of NATO," Survival, 26 (1984), 245; Ismay, op. cit.,
P• 9.
66
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op. cit., p. 16.
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if any member is attacked.6 7

That has allayed fears of a

resurgent West Germany enough to allow it to become what the
U.S. insisted on--a key part of the NATO deterrence effort
for all of Europe.
The main responsibility of the WEU was originally to
oversee the German rearmament.

In recent years, however,

that responsibility has steadily eroded to the point now
non~existent.

where it is almost

Controls against German

production of different types of conventional arms have
gradually been

removed.

The

last

restrictions

against

German production of conventional arms were removed in a WEU
Council meeting in June of 1984. 6 8
The French Withdrawal
The final major event in the evolution of NATO was the
French withdrawal from the integrated military command.
February

21,

1966,

French

President

Charles

de

On

Gaulle

announced at a press conference that all French forces in
Germany and all French personnel assigned to Allied commands
would be withdrawn from Allied command on July 1,
NATO was also asked to remove its headquarters
all NATO forces and facilities
April 1, 1967.

1966.

(SHAPE),

and

from French territory by

In addition, the French wanted all U.S. and

67

Joffe, op. cit., p. 71.

68

s 1 o an ,

NAT o' s Fu t u r e , op. c i t . , pp. 1 7 3 -1 7 4 •
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Canadian installations on French soil to be closed or their
commands transferred to France by the same date.
did,

however,

from

NATO

command.

De Gaulle

make it clear that France was not withdrawing

entirely--just

from

the

integrated

military

Indeed, he promised that France would continue to

abide by treaty obligations and continue to participate in
the political aspects of NAT0.69
Even though the announcement was greeted with alarm
from several Allied capitals,
for

quite some

time.70

the French attitude was known

In the 1950's,

France became

disillusioned with the Alliance, especially with the U.S.,
when the NATO allies expressed their support for the French
role

in

Indochina but then refused

to

provide critical

military assistance to French forces when they were under
siege at Dien Bien Phu (now part of northern Vietnam).

The

French became further exasperated when the U.S. did not
support France in their military struggle in Algeria and
again

when

the

U.S.

actively

opposed

Britain in the Suez Canal crisis of 1956.

France

and

Great

From these events

and others, France came to resent American leadership in the
Alliance and longed for a much more independent role in
69
James A. Huston, One for All:
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N.J.:
University of Delaware Press, 1984), pp. 143-144;
Sloan, NATO's Futur:e, op. cit., p. 37.
70
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global affairs. 71

The decision to end its relationship with

NATO's integrated military command was a consequence of
these

feelings.
The Alliance suffered some important political costs as

a result of the French move.

The political balance within

the Alliance was substantially altered--forcing even more
dependence on American leadership because of the reduced
French influence.

More significant to this thesis, however,

the French move also had some detrimental effects on NATO's
military capabilities--mainly in communication and supply
lines.

The

loss

of France

in

the

integrated

military

command of NATO meant not only that the allies could no
longer rely on French troops joining any future battle for
the defense of Europe, but that allied efforts to bring in
reinforcements

and

new

supplies

would

be

much

more

vulnerable to enemy attacks since they would be forced to
use seaports much closer

to probable

front

lines of

battle. 72
Fortunately, the Allies were up to the challenge that
the French withdrawal posed.
an

emotional outburst

decision,

when

Instead of allowing themselves
the

French

announced

their

they all maintained their restraint and went about

71

Sloan, NATO's Future, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

72

Ibid., pp. 37-38.
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trying to solve the new problems with efficiency.

According

to Harlan Cleveland, then the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, even
"President Johnson,
Gaulle

stretched

language,

whose private references
his

considerable

talent

to General de
for

colorful

imposed an icy correctness on those who had reason

to discuss French policy in public. 11 73

The Allies succeeded

in reestablishing all necessary NATO institutions in new
locations outside of France without much delay. 74
NATO Today
The

12

original

member

Canada, Denmark, France,
Nether lands,

Nor way,

United States.

countries

Iceland,

Portugal,

Belgium,

were:

Italy, Luxembourg,

the Uni tea Kingdom,

the

and the

Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952.

Germany joined in 1955 and Spain joined in 1982. 75

West
NATO's

16 nations are organized into a framework of political and
military consultation that
discuss pertinent issues.

meets on a

regular

It is designed

basis to

to provide

security for its members through a two-track approach of
deterrence

and

dialogue.

supranational organization,

Since

the

alliance

is

not

a

each member country remains

73
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sovereign with equal status.

Therefore,

all NATO decisions

must be reached by a consensus of its members.

This makes

for a cumbersome decision-making process that must allow for
the different viewpoints of each member. 76
The forum within NATO for political decision-making and
consultation is called the North Atlantic Council.
Council is NATO's highest authority.
every

week

at

representatives),

the

ambassador

The

The Council meets
level

(permanent

twice a year at the ministerial level

(member country foreign ministers)
heads of state level.

and occasionally at the

Because of the French withdrawal from

the defense structure, the Council must meet in another form
for

military decision-making and consultation.

is called the Defense Planning Committee (DPC}.

This forum
In defense

matters, the DPC has the same authority as the Council.

The

ambassador or permanent representative level here also meets
at

least once a

week,

but

membership

in

this

unit

is

composed of representatives from countries who are members
of NATO's integrated military command.

The DPC ministerial

level also meets twice a year, but the ministers here are
the defense ministers of each member country.

76
Cit. I

Both the DPC

NATO Handbook, op. cit., pp. 21-22 and 33; Lunn, op.
p. 10.
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and the Council are chaired by the Secretary General of
NATO who is currently Lord Carrington of Great Britain. 77
The foundation of the study has now been completed.
NATO's history has been discussed and the organization's
structure examined.

At this point, the reader should have a

good basic understanding of the complexities of NATO.

The

stage is now set to explore the main subject of this study-NATO conventional defense.

77
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CHAPTER 3
NATO CONVENTIONAL BATTLEFIELD STRATEGY

At the time of this writing the historic mini-summit at
Reykjavik,

Iceland, was recently concluded.

At that meeting

between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev of
the Soviet Union,

it was proposed for the first time in the

history of arms control talks that all nuclear weapons be
gradually phased out.
proposal

has

yet

to

Although an agreement on that
be

achieved,

the

fact

that

the

possibility of its realization does exist accentuates the
importance

of

conventional

defense. 7 8

without

nuclear

weapons NATO defense in general and Central European defense
in particular will ultimately fall back on conventional,
chemical or biological weapons.
biological

weapons

is

a

The use of chemical and/or

real possibility,

but

their

consideration is beyond the scope of this study.
Currently,

the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies

have numerical superiority over the NATO allies in almost
every category of conventional weaponry.

Table 1 on page 37

shows the striking differences between NATO and Warsaw Pact
forces.

78
Secretary George Schultz, U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau
of Public Affairs, Reykjavik:
A Watershed in u.s.-soviet
Relations, Current Policy No. 883 (Washington, D.C.:
GPO,
1986), 1.
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Table 1.

NATO/WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL BATTLEFIELD FORCES
IN EUROPE

Category

NAT0 1

Pact 2

90
19,600

133
32,000

14,200

23,000

13,370

18,000

6,900

12,800

32,850

38,000

Ground Forces
Division Equivalents3
Main Battle Tanks
Artillery, Mortar, & Multiple
Rocket Launchers
Anti-tank Guns and Missile
Launchers
Anti-aircraft Guns and Missile
Launchers
Armored Personnel Carriers and
Infantry Fighting Vehicles
Aircraft
Armed Helicopters
Land Attack Aircraft 4
Fighter/Interceptors
Source:

1,430
2,360
900

1,410
3,2005
2,700

Adapted from Andrew Hamilton, "Redressing the
Conventional Balance," International Security 10
(Summer 1985), 114; U.S. Department of Defense,
Soviet Military Power 1987 (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1987), pp. 92-93.

1

U.S. Estimate of 1986 NATO data; excludes France and
Spain; in place in Europe and rapidly deployable forces.
2

In place in Europe and rapidly deployable forces.

3

Warsaw Pact divisions normally consist of fewer
personnel than many NATO divisions but contain more tanks
and artillery, thereby obtaining similar combat power.
4

Includes reconnaissance aircraft.

5

Excludes Soviet strategic (long-range)

intereceptors.
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Numbers alone however, do not tell the entire story.
Other factors that contribute to the ability of the U.S. and
its NATO allies to defend Central Europe with conventional
weapons include the following:

the quality of the weapons,

the quality of the troops and their training,
the troops,
command

the morale of

the skill of the field commanders and their

style,

the

efficiency

of

communications,

the

accuracy and quantity of intelligence, and the deployment
and employment of an effective battlefield strategy (for the
advantages of the defense see Chapter 4).
Although

it

is beyond

the

scope of

this

thesis

to

examine all of these topics,

the discussion of this chapter

and

thesis

the remainder of the

will

conventional battlefield strategies.

center

on

NATO

The debate over the

acceptability of the current battlefield strategy is ongoing,

but it is felt that the current NATO conventional

battlefield strategy has some advantages that are commonly
over looked when examining the NATO defense posture.

These

advantages will be examined in chapter 4 after the following
discussion on NATO strategy itself.
Early Strategies
The evolution of today's NATO battlefield strategy for
the defense of Central Europe began in the early days of
NATO when the balance of forces in Europe was significantly
more in favor of the Warsaw Pact (Pact), the military and

39

political alliance of eastern European countries which is
dominated by the Soviet Union and opposed to NATO.

Phillip

Karber, a distinguished defense analyst, says that in the
1950's,

NATO had to defend 900 km of front with only 35

brigades (a brigade is about 2,500-5,000 men),

while the

Soviets and their allies had over three times as many troops
stationed in or near Central Europe. 79
With their forces outnumbered three-to-one, NATO was
forced to adopt a "Fallback" strategy.

This strategy used

the Rhine River in West Germany as the anchor for a prepared
defense.

In the event of an attack by opposing forces,

NATO

troops were to retreat behind the river while conducting a
series of mobile screening actions to cover the retreat.
These screening actions together with heavy American bombing
of the Soviet Union would combine to delay and weaken the
attack.

Using the river as a formidable barrier, the NATO

forces would regroup on its western bank and halt the enemy
advance. 80
NATO's introduction of approximately 7,000 tactical
nuclear weapons (TNW's) and the buildup of the West German

79
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Army

allowed

the

modification

of conventional

battlefield

strategy in the 1960's.

The TNW's gave NATO firepower and

the ability

any

to counter

conventional
lines.

forces

for

a

Pact attempt
breakthrough

to
in

concentrate
NATO defense

The new weapons also gave NATO depth by providing

the ability to extend the delaying zone of battle well into
Eastern Europe.

Nuclear

interdiction strikes could now

target the second echelon of Pact reinforcements, as well as
This "Trip Wire"

lines of communication and air bases.

strategy called for NATO's conventional forces to act merely
as a triggering device for the TNW's.

In the face of any

type of aggression, NATO's commanders were authorized to use
the TNW's to prevent an enemy breakthrough.Bl
Tod~s

German rearmament
Defense

both

Strategy

after

militarily and

World War

II made Forward

politically necessary.

First,

the rearmament of West Germany added three full corps to
NATO forces

in Central Europe.

This enabled the entire

front to be covered by NATO forces because the density of
brigades available for the defense line was doubled by the
German contribution.
the

Pact's

quantitative

manageable 1.5:1.
81

The German contribution also reduced

Second,

superiority

ratio

to

a

very

mindful that any sacrifice of

Ibid.; Park, op. cit., p. 30.
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territory could become permanent,
any

such

strategy

as

forward based strategy.

the Ger man people regard

unacceptable

so

they

insist on a

If NATO battlefield strategy had

continued to call for a rapid fallback to the Rhine .River,
sacrificing a

tremendous amount of German

territory in

exchange for gaining time for reinforcements to arrive,

the

West German's would have had nothing to gain by remaining in
NATO and contributing forces for the common defense. 82
The doctrine

for

today's

NATO battlefield

strategy

originated with the official adoption of NATO's Military
Committee document 14/3 {MC 14/3) in March of 1967.
called

Flexible

Response

and

remains

in

effect

It is
today.

NATO's doctrine of flexible response developed as a result
of Soviet advances in strategic nuclear weapons and TNW's.
The Soviet advances that impelled the adoption of NATO's
defense doctrine also made NATO's "Trip Wire" or "Massive
Retaliation"

strategy

invalid.

When

the

Soviet

Un ion

acquired virtually the same nuclear capability as the United
States,

NATO's previous strategy of

threatening

escalation

to nuclear weapons lost its credibility because doing so
would mean mutual destruction since both sides had acquired
the ability to carry out a second strike with strategic
82
Karber, op. cit., p. 28; Roger L.L. Facer,
Conventional Forces and the NATO Strategy of Flexible
Response:
Issues and Approaches (San~a Monica, California:
Rand Corp., 1985), p. 15; Park, op. cit., p. 177.
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forces from only one country, but there are five different
countries with forces assigned to the front.

It is believed

that using forces from five different countries adds to
deterrence

by

making

it

more

apparent

that

any

attack

against NATO territory would be an attack against several
countries not just one. 88

Figure l shows which countries

have military responsibility for
NATO's central front.

which corps sectors on

The length of these corps sectors

varies from 35 kilometers for the Belgian corps sector to
200 kilometers for the II west German corps sector.

During

peacetime,

each corps is stationed in barracks at different

distances

from

the front.

Warsaw Pact attack,

however,

In

the event of an imminent

each corps will be deployed at

its battle positions on or very near the central front.

The

objective in the strategy is to defeat any Pact attack right
at the border.8 9

The following two subsections describe the

method that would be employed to achieve the objective.
Tactics
Over

the

years,

divergent

political

and

military

interests among the various NATO countries have contributed
to the tendency of each national army having a different

88

Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 169; Mako, op. cit., p. 33.

89

Facer, op. cit., p. 16.
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Figure 1. NATO's Central Front:
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preference for the tactics to be used.
however,

In the mid 1970's

the NATO countries that provide forces for

the

defense of Central Europe agreed to use the tactic called
"Active

Defense"

to

Forward Defense.

carry

out

the

force,

counterattack.
NATO's

the

It has three elements, the

defense

Probably the

battlefield

Strategy:

strategy of

Active Defense is a combination of

established battlefield tactics.
covering

overall

in

sector,

best source for

tactics

is

Karber's

In Defense of Forward Defense."

and

the

discussion on

article,

"The

The following

passage is based on that article. 9 0
The

first

element of Active

Defense,

the covering

force, engages the enemy as soon as the border is breached
by invading forces.

The object of the covering force is the

same as the traditional tactic of "Delay/Screening" (a form
of antitank guerrilla warfare) which is to harass and ambush
the leading elements of the invading force.

Under Active

Defense however, the covering force is heavily reinforced
with

mechanized

infantry

and

tank

units.

The

heavier

concentration of men and armour allows the covering force to
ensure that no forward units penetrate the main defense line
at high speed.

The

intense

resistance provided

by the

covering force significantly reduces the rate of advance by
forcing the invaders to regroup into an assault formation
90

Karber, op. cit., p. 42 and pp. 45-46.
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instead of a

march

column.

Reducing

the

speed

of

the

attacking forces provides the main body of the defense with
critical time to assemble and complete the fortification of
the chief defensive positions 20 to 30 kilometers behind the
initial

point

of

engagement.

This

heavily

entrenched

section allows the covering force to commit itself to more
intense

combat

by

providing

an

area

behind

covering force can regroup if necessary.

which

the

Even though the

covering force does not engage in decisive battles, it has
enough resources and firepower to inflict heavy damage upon
an invading force in every likely avenue of attack against
NATO territory in Central Europe.

Figure 2 shows the most

likely axes of advance in a Pact attack on NATO.

In order

of most danger to NATO, these axes are the Fulda Gap,
North German Plain,
routes)

and

determined
armored

the

the Hof Corridor
Gottingen

by the

forces

and

the

(primary and secondary

Corridor.

suitability of

the

the

location of

These axes
terrain

the

for

are

large

most desirable

targets inside NATO territory.
As the battle continues,

the covering force will begin

to withdraw behind the main body of the defense.

This main

body of defense forms the second element of Active Defense.
It

is

called

the

"Defense-in-Sector"

and

refers

to

the

sectors of military responsibility mentioned earlier.

The

primary object of

the

Defense-in-Sector

is

similar

to
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Figure 2. Most Likely Routes of a Pact Attack Against NATO
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traditional tactic of "Positional Defense" which is to make
maximum use of prepared or fortified terrain
barriers)

(mines and

and natural obstacles with dense dug-in

infantry

and prepositioned armored forces to stop or greatly inhibit
the forward momentum of an invading force.

Defense-in-

Sector differs from Positional Defense however,
is designed to be somewhat elastic.

in that it

Although the tactic

seeks to provide enough density of forces to channel the
advance and prevent rapid enemy maneuver through uncovered
gaps,

it

also allows a

defensive

line

degree of

to prevent being

echeloned Pact attack.

flexibility

overrun

by a

in the
massed

In the face of a concentrated heavy

attack on a relatively small area (breakthrough attempt) the
front-line NATO commanders have the authority to let the
defensive line bend or flex.

As the defensive line bends in

the face of a breakthrough attempt,
enemy

threat

is

identified

and

the area of greatest

commanders

can

commit

tactical reserves to the battle along with battalion task
forces and uncommitted units from dormant
front.

areas of the

Here, the momentum of the attack is greatly slowed

or stopped.

Because of a high degree of attrition and the

greater amount of territory the advancing force must cover,
the enemy's density of force is tremendously reduced.
the

bulging defense

line has exposed

invading force and allowed
overextended

with

its lead

weakened

the

flanks

elements

lines

of

Also,
of the

to become

supply

and
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communication.

At this point,

the third and final element

of Active Defense, the counterattack, is initiated.
The object of

the counterattack

is

most

like

the

traditional tactic of "Mobile Defense," which is to take
advantage of the vulnerable flank areas of an invading force
by maneuvering to attack

those positions eventually

encircling its forward units and cutting them off from their
supply and communication lines.

Other short-term goals in

this tactic include slicing deep into the enemy's rear area
and destroying vital air defense systems,

artillery support

and supply depots.

the counterattack

Under Active Defense,

may also take the form of a frontal assault on depleted
units of the first echelon of a Pact attack with the aim of
rendering them ineffective or destroying them completely
before the second Pact echelon arrives.
aim of

In either case, the

the counterattack is to regain control of lost

territory.
It is important to realize that the three sequences of
the Active Defense tactic are not set in concrete.

They may

have to be repeated a number of times and in the event one
or

more of

the

three phases cannot

be

adjustments can be made on the battlefield.

carried

out,

For instance,

if the Pact attack comes perilously close to achieving a
breakthrough,

instead of preparing for a counterattack,

tactical reserve units and other less-threatened nearby

51
battalions

and

cross-attached

companies

would

form

a

covering force while the main body of the defense would
withdraw 10-20 kilometers and set up a new main defensive
belt.

From there the sequence would start over.

Air/Ground Interdiction
An

integral part of

the

overall

scheme

of

NATO

conventional battlefield strategy is the joint air/ground
interdiction of invading Pact forces.
Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe

The name that Supreme
(SHAPE)

has given this

concept is Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA).

FOFA is not a

new concept but it does represent a shift in emphasis for
NATO conventional battlefield strategy. 91
There has always been
ground and air

forces

on

a

direct connection between

the

battlefield.

inception of the forward defense strategy,

From

the

NATO's air assets

were relied upon to provide heavy close air support for
friendly ground forces in an effort to hold off any Pact
breakthrough

attempt.

But

the

last

ten years

saw a

tremendous improvement in 1) the ability of Pact air forces
to conduct offensive air attacks on NATO territory, and 2)
the effectiveness of air defense units in mobile Pact ground
91
Bernard w. Rogers, "Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA):
Myths and Realities," NATO Review 32 (Dec. 1984}, l; Thomas
A. Cardwell III, "Follow-On Forces Attack:
Joint
Interdiction by Another Name," Military Review 66 (Feb.
1986), 9.
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forces.

The improvements were so dramatic that airspace

protection began to draw an increasingly large amount of
NATO air-force resources.

so, on November 9, 1984, the NATO

DPC approved the integration of FOFA into official NATO
conventional battlefield strategy.
make

ground-force

interdiction

FOFA is an attempt to

combine

with

interdiction to become more decisive and potent.

air-force
What made

FOFA possible was an influx of technological innovation.
NATO commanders had always sought the same objectives that
FOFA called for but lacked the technological capability to
achieve those objectives.

Advances in mobile-target

acquisition systems and the ability to destroy or delay Pact
second echelon assets with air/ground

interdiction well to

the rear of the point of contact with NATO defense forces,
have given NATO a significantly improved ability to deny
success to any Pact breakthrough attempt. 92
In the words of General Rogers, the NATO SACEUR, FOFA
is designed to attack "those enemy forces which stretch from
just behind the troops in contact to as far into the enemy's
rear as our

target acquisition and conventional weapons

systems will permit." 93

The objective of FOFA is to reduce

92
Kar be r , op. c i t. , p. 4 6 ; Roger s, op. c i t. , pp. 1 0 3 ;
Boyd D. Sutton et al., "Deep Attack Concepts and the Defence
of Central Europe," Survival 26 (March/April 1984), 51.
93

Roger s , op. c i t. , p. 2.
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to a controllable level the number of Pact forces coming in
contact with the NATO main defense body by attacking the
overall Pact military potential before it can engage the
defenders.

The concept was developed with the knowledge

that invading Pact forces would be deployed in a series of
succeeding echelons and operational maneuver groups

(OMG's)

designed to maneuver quickly to exploit any weakness that
may develop in NATO defense lines.

FOFA was also developed

with the assumption that NATO and Warsaw Pact forces would
be relatively evenly matched in the first echelon but that
the NATO defense could hold only if succeeding Pact echelons
could be kept out of the forward battle until it was most
advantageous to the NATO defenders. 94
NATO forces
disrupting,

will seek

delaying,

to accomplish

the goal of

or destroying Pact second echelon

forces and OMG's (follow-on forces) by joint interdiction.
Joint interdiction is the use of conventional air attacks
and other conventional long-range weapon systems controlled
by ground forces to strike targets beyond the immediate
contact zone of battle.

These targets include

military forces but also their supply depots,
including

bridges

transporting

94
cit.

the

and

choke

supplies,

points,

airfields,

supply routes

the
and

not~only

means

command

of
and

Ibid., pp. 1-2; Cardwell, op. cit., p. 6; Sutton, loc.
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control communication centers.

While NATO policy forbids

land incursions outside of its borders, gaining depth to the
battlefield by FOFA
battlefield

is

strategy of

fully

consistent

Forward Defense.

with
Even

the

NATO

if FOFA

succeeds only in slowing down the Pact momentum of combat
operations and inflicting minor attrition, it is expected to
have a

major

impact on

the

successful defense of

PP·

5-7;

NATO

territory. 95

95
Rogers, op.
Karber, loc. cit.

Cit• I

Cardwell,

loc.

cit.;
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CHAPTER 4
FORWARD DEFENSE FACTORS

Factors Complementing Forward Defense
Natural Barriers (Terrain)
One of the most important advantages that a defender
has against an attacker is familiarity of terrain.

This has

been repeatedly proven in armed conflict from Ancient China
through

Wor ld

War

II

to

pre sent - day

Af g ha n i s tan.

The

willingness and ability to go where the enemy cannot, or
thinks you cannot,
used

to conceal

firepower.

is a limitless value.
forces

or

Terrain can be

protect them

from hostile

It can also inhibit the ability of an attacker

to maneuver, forcing him to channel his forces and thereby
allowing the defender to concentrate his resources where he
needs

them

the

most.

The

terrain

along

the

IGB

is

considered to be the best terrain in Central Europe for
defending against an attack. 96
CENTAG.

In the CENTAG sectors of Central Europe, the

terrain is generally very obstacle-ridden,

with many major

96
U.S. Army, Operations:
FM 100-5 (Washington, D.C.:
Department of the Army, 1982), pp. 3/4-3/5; Karber, op.
cit., p. 33; John J. Mearsheimer, "Maneuver, Mobile Defense,
and the NATO Central Front," International Security 6
(Winter 1981-82), 116; Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the
Swift:
Thoughts on Twenty First Centurl._~~rf~ (London:
Brassey' s Defense Publishers, 1985), p. 73.
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natural barriers to armored maneuver.

They include 1) the

Fichtel and Rhon Mountains, 2) the Bavarian, Bohemian and
Franconian Forests, and 3) the Fulda, Leine, Main, Werra,
and Weser Rivers.

These natural barriers would drastically

reduce the speed of a Pact advance, thus allowing NATO extra
ti me to maneuver and reinforce

Consequently

its defenses.

there are only a few axes of ingress in the CENTAG area that
would facilitate the kind of rapid advance that Pact
offensive strategy calls for.
attack (see Figure 2)
NORTHAG.

Each of these likely axes of

is well defended by NATO forces. 97

The NORTHAG area of Central Europe is widely

thought

to

be

more

vulnerable

because

it

is dominated

to

by open

invasion
terrain

movement of massive armored forces.

than

ideal

CENTAG
for

the

However, NORTHAG is not

the achilles heel of NATO that some may think

it to be.

There are two terrain factors that are bases for optimism.
First, the NORTHAG area covers territory that is less than
half the size of CENTAG,

which means that a greater density

of defenders can be achieved with fewer forces.
NORTHAG area is not obstacle free.
impediments

to armored

forces

in

Second, the

Significant natural
the

NORTHAG district

include 1) the Harz Mountains in the Belgian sector,

2) the

97
John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win
Quickly in Europe," In terna t ion al Security 7 (Summer 1982),
20 and 22; Facer, op. cit., p. 16; "Germany South," The
Times Atlas of the World, 1985 ed.; Sutton, loc. cit.
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Luneburger Heath in the German sector,

3)

the Elbe River in

the Dutch sector, and 4) a number of smaller rivers, bogs
and canals scattered throughout the area.98
The NATO advantage of using existing natural barriers
to inhibit a Pact attack would be forfeited if the defensive
forces

were deployed anywhere

possible.

except as

far

forward

as

The reason for this is that although there are

significant numbers
obstacles

along

noticeably

of

the

decreases

territory.

Beyond

strategically

IGB,

the

beyond

50

value
50

important
of

these

kilometers

kilometers,

terrain

obstacles

inside

NATO

the avenues of attack

become wider and easier to maneuver large numbers of armored
forces.

Pact forces in this type of terrain would find it

much easier to achieve their military objectives rapidly,
thus denying NATO the opportunity to reinforce its defenses
with the vast resources of its North American members. 99
Man-made Barriers
Another

important

factor

that

complements

NATO's

forward defense strategy is the opportunity to use man-made
barriers to slow or defeat an attack.
have

two

categories:

98
Mearsheimer,
24-26.
99

1)

prepared

Man-made barriers
obstacles

"Why the soviets Can't Win," op. cit.,

Karber, op. cit., p. 34.

and

pp.
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fortifications,

Both types can be a

and 2) built-up areas.

tremendous hindrance to a Pact invasion force because they
negate Pact advantages of surprise,

initiative and speed.

Prepared Obstacles and Fortifications.

Fortifications

can add to the defender's effectiveness by concealing and
protecting

supplies

and

communication

centers

thereby

allowing more efficient targeting of the invading forces.
Obstacles can also

increase an attacker's vulnerability

to

the defender's firepower by slowing or stopping his rate of
advance.

The slower

the rate of advance,

becomes to fire accurately on the at tacker,
his

casualties.

A study by James

analyst for the Rand Corporation,

F.

the easier it
thus increasing

Digby,

a

defense

showed that an attacker's

casualties will be increased by 60 percent if the defender
can reduce the rate of advance to a third of its original
speed.loo
Some barriers, obstacles and defensive works can be
developed

in peacetime without

civilian interests.

inordinate

intrusion on

Others however, are much more obtrusive

and dangerous and therefore cannot be prepared until the
outbreak of hostilities becomes imminent.

These barriers

include 1) bridge demolition and 2) mines deployed by ground
forces or scattered by artillery and aviation units. 101

100

Freeman, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

101

Ibid., p. 12; U.S. Army, op. cit., p. 3/7.
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Built-Up Areas.

The second type of

man-made barriers

that complement Forward Defense is urban areas.

Much of

Central Europe either is now or is becoming dominated by
cities.

An invading force from Eastern Europe would

encounter some type of city, town or village an average of
every six kilometers.

Sixty percent of

the

terrain in

Central Europe is covered by either dense forests or urban
areas. 10 2
Built-up or

urban areas offer

the defender good

protection and concealment as well as very good points of
observation and fields of fire.
Stalingrad, Hue,
shown

and most recently Beirut among others have

that over-running

disproportionate

Famous battles for Tobruk,

urban areas:

amount of

resources,

1)
2)

consumes a

restricts

the

ability to maneuver, 3) dramatically slows down the momentum
of an offensive, and 4} takes a tremendous amount of time.
The

Soviets

appear

to

be

well

aware

of

the

defensive

advantages of built-up areas since their official policy
seems to call for bypassing them.
into

the

obstacles,

hands of

Yet, doing so also plays

NATO defenders,

because,

like

other

it would force the invaders to channel their

102 Freeman, op. cit., p. 14; Karber, loc. cit.; Paul
Bracken, "Urban Sprawl and NATO Defense," Survival 18
(Nov./Dec. 1976} 255.
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forces into areas that will be well prepared for just such
an occurrence.103
Force-to-Space Ratios
The density of the defense or the ratio of the number
of

forces

present

to

the

amount of

space

available

is

another important factor that complements NATO's Forward
Defense strategy.

On the European central front there is a

finite amount of space that NATO forces must defend (225 km
in NORTHAG and

500 km

in CENTAG).

defenders in that space
certain amount,
move

through

superiority.
to

hold

When the density of

(force to space ratio) reaches a

it becomes very difficult for an attacker to
that

space

regardless of his numerical

The defender in this situation should be able

off

the

attack

long

enough

to

bring

up

reinforcements or even initiate counterattacks. 104
When

a

Pact

invasion

force

advances,

it

must

concentrate its forces in axes of attack in order to achieve
the overwhelming numerical superiority necessary to achieve
a breakthrough.
The

factors

However, space is a factor here as well.

discussed

above,

the

terrain

and

man-made

barriers, will force the attacker to channel his forces in a
103 Karber, loc. cit.;
Bracken, op. cit., p. 15.

U.S.

Army,

op.

cit.,

p.

3/8;

104 Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win," op. cit., pp.
27-28; Mako, op. cit., p. 36.
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limited space.

Therefore, the number of forces that NATO

defenders will be up against at any given time during an
attack will be only those that the given space allows.

The

remainder of the Pact forces will not be at the actual point
of attack but in the rear areas as secondary echelons where
they have a minimal impact on the outcome of the battle.
This means that the force to space ratio does not include
the overall balance of forces but only those forces that are
actually at the point of engagement. 105
-

Another aspect of force

to

space

ratios

that

is

advantageous to Forward Defense is the length of the
defensive line.

The shorter the length of the defense line,

the greater the density of defenders.

By defending forward,

NATO shortens the defense line and thus creates a greater
density of defenders with the same number of forces.

If

NATO set up its main body of defense 120 km from the IGB
instead of
Defense

within

strategy,

50 km
it

where

would

it

require

is

under

50%

the Forward

more

forces

to

acquire the same density of defenders, because the line of
defense would be lengthened by a third.106

105

Park, op. cit., p. 181; Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 27.

106

Karber, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
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Attrition and Exchange Rates
The next

two

factors

that complement NATO defense

strategy are attrition rates and exchange rates.
is

the

total casualties resulting

battle.

Attrition

from engagement

in a

It includes not only personnel losses but also

material

losses.

The outcome of

a

battle

is partly

determined by a belligerent inflicting a higher attrition
rate

on

his opponent.

In

armed

conflict,

usually suffers a higher rate of attrition.

the offense

In other words,

the total percent loss of force during combat is usually
greater for the attacking force.

That is one of the reasons

why both NATO and the Soviets believe that Pact forces must
outnumber NATO forces by at least 3:1 to be successful. 1 07
As the battle continues over a period of hours or days, the
attrition rate would affect the total force ratio on both
sides.

The

lethality

NATO advantages discussed
of

modern

NATO

anti-tank

earlier,

and

weapons,

progressively reduce the Pact numerical superiority as
battle continues.

the
will
the

The question then becomes, what kind of

107 Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional
Balance," International Secur i tl, 9 (Winter 1984-85) 56 and
78-79; Simpkin, op. cit., p. 20; Mearsheimer, "Conventional
Deterrence," op. cit., p. 34; Killebrew, op. cit., p. 108.
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attrition

rate

can

Pact

forces

endure

before

they

are

rendered incapable of achieving their objectives.108
Contrary to what some may believe,
divisions do not fight

to the finish.

armored fighting
In real combat,

commanders of an attacking force will withdraw their forces
for recuperation when they have been reduced to 50% or less
of their original strength.

Some relatively recent examples

of armored warfare indicate that in intense combat similar
to what can be expected in breakthrough sectors of a Pact
invasion,

a daily attrition rate of 10% has been sustained.

After suffering a sustained daily attrition rate of 10%,

it

is easy to see how whole Pact divisions would be rendered
ineffective after only a few days.109
Attrition rates are closely paralleled by exchange
rates.

Exchange rates are the number of losses incurred by

a belligerent compared to the number of losses incurred by
his opponent during the battle.

If the defender loses one

armored vehicle for every two that the attacker loses, the
exchange rate is 2:1.

Many defense analysts today believe

that NATO should be able to achieve an exchange rate of 2:1.
108
Michael L. Brown and Thomas J. Leney, "Conventional
Defense:
Technology, Doctrine, and Force Structure," in
Golden, op. cit. pp. 166-169; Posen, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
For a discussion on the effectiveness of NATO anti-tank
weapons see Brown, loc. cit. and John J. Mearsheimer,
"Precision Guided Munitions and Conventional Deterrence,"
Survival, 20 (March-April 1979}, 68-77.
109

Posen, op. cit., pp. 55-56 and 60.
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However, as displayed in table 4.1, there is ample reason to
conclude that the exchange rate in a NATO/Pact conflict
could exceed 2:1 in NATO's favor.

Both of these two factors

will complement NATO's defensive strategy by significantly
reducing the Pact's numerical superiority during the course
of battle. 110
Command Style
The final complementary factor to be discussed here is
the style in which NATO forces are commanded.
style of

NATO uses a

mission-oriented orders otherwise known as

"Auftragstaktik."

Mission-oriented orders are characterized

by very general instructions with an absolute minimum of
detail.
objective,

Orders of this type usually
the reason for the objective,

area of operation.

include only an
and the general

This type of command style allows for

the greatest amount of independence and initiative on the
part of all subordinate commanders.

It allows NATO field

commanders the maximum amount of leeway in interpreting and

110

Ibid., pp. 56 and 80-81.
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executing those orders, according to the rapidly changing
situations and opportunities of the battle. 111
The Warsaw Pact on the other hand,

uses a style of

detail-oriented orders otherwise known as "Befehlstaktik."
Detail-oriented orders stress constant absolute control from
the highest down to the lowest level of command.

Orders of

this type include the most minute details with intricate
planning.

This command style demands absolute centralized

control and coordination of action down· to the smallest unit
on

the battlefield and as such,

requires

elements as part of the command structure.
commanders
officers

for

example

directly

under

each
their

have

liaison

Soviet division

fourteen

command.

officers also has his own staff,

large

subordinate

Each

of

these

making coordination of

staff activities very cumbersome.112
With this type of expanded span-of-control, Pact forces
will most assuredly have a very difficult time responding to
rapidly changing battlefield situations especially in the
face of the kind of surprise major counterattacks that NATO
tactics call for.

Faced with NATO-style counterattacks

in

111 F.W. von Mellenthin and R.H.S. Stolfi with E. Sobik,
NATO Under Attack:
Why the Western Alliance Can Fight
Outnumbered and Win in Central Europe Without Nuclear
weapons (Durham, North Carolina:
Duke University Press,
1984), p. 133; Killebrew, op. cit., p. 49; U.S. Army, op.
cit., p. 2/7.
112

Von Mellenthin, op. cit., pp. 134-135 and 143.
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World War II, under the same type of command style, Soviet
forces often panicked and rapidly disintegrated.

Under

intense battle conditions, with disrupted communications and
massive

confusion,

reacting

to

rapidly

the

command

changing

style

most

situations

capable

will

create

of
a

tremendous advantage on the battlef ield.113
Factors Affecting Forward Defense Implementation
Surprise Attack
A surprise attack could have a devastating effect on
the implementation of NATO's forward defense strategy.

This

is

that

especially obvious

when one considers the fact

during peace time, less than 2S% of NATO's active brigades
are

stationed

positions. 114

within

SO

km

of

their

main

defensive

The scattered reconnaissance units stationed

on the border would be virtually alone in trying to stop the
first wave of a surprise attack.

Invading forces could even

accept

and

inferiority

in

numbers

still

be

militarily

successful because NATO forces would not be deployed to
resist the attack.llS

113

Ibid., p. 134; Killebrew, op. cit., p. SO.

114

Park, op. cit., p. 184.

llS

Killebrew, op. cit., p. 91.
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The most effective results for such an attack would
probably be achieved

by

launching

the

attack

from

a

standing-start on a dark stormy holiday evening with no
advance warning.

Some defense analysts believe that the

Soviets now have that capability.

The attacking forces

would seek to penetrate deeply into NATO's rear by drilling
and splitting the defenses and their

reinforcements before

they

designated

had

a

positions.

chance

to

take

their

wartime

As they advanced, these forces would continue to

cause confusion and disorganization in the NATO ranks by
capturing or destroying command, control, communication and
intelligence

(C 3 I) posts while attacking prime targets such

as nuclear missile sites,
airfields.

The

conventional weapons depots,

tactic

would

most

likely

and

achieve

considerable military success at least in the early stages
of

battle.

However,

there

are

also ample

reasons

for

optimism toward NATO's defense against a surprise attack. 116
If a surprise attack becomes the method chosen for
invading NATO territory,

the forward-based Soviet uni ts are

likely to be the only forces used for the attack.
two reasons for this.

First, the most valuable commodity in

a surprise attack is the element of surprise.
and

There are

many western analysts question

116 Von Mellenthin, op. cit.,
183; Killebrew, lac. cit.

p.

The Soviets

the ability of East

122; Park, op. cit., p.
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European members of the Warsaw Pact to maintain that element
of surprise.

With that in mind, the Soviets would be very

leery of involving other Pact countries in a surprise attack
for fear that some East European source might aid NATO in
discovering the impending attack.

Second, the larger the

scale of preparations for an attack,

the greater the

likelihood of being discovered and losing the element of
surprise.

Large-scale preparations for

r~latively easy to detect.117

attack would be

As noted by Richard K.

Betts

in his book, Surprise Attack, there are many indicators that
could tip off an impending Pact attack:
--Intensified enemy reconnaissance in the battle
area.
--Logistics vectors.
How are military infrastructure and support trails being reoriented?
Are supplies and fuel being moved forward? Are
field hospitals being established?
--Dispersal of nuclear weapons from peacetime
storage sites.
--Are troops leaving caserns moving into areas
different from normal maneuver zones?
If being
deployed to quell internal unrest rather than to
attack NATO territory, they will probably move
in all directions, not just toward the border.
--Positioning of artillery, which is usually
different if optimized for attack rather than
defense.
--Forward movement of air defense units.
--Repositioning of headquarters and administrative
staff.
--Coverage of flanks.
--Ammunition loading patterns.
{One problem is
that in an exercise, no immediate intelligence

117 Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack {Washington, D.C.:
Brookings, 1982), p. 197; Park, op. cit., p. 182; Von
Mellenthin, loc. cit.

69

is available on whether the troops are loading
live ammunition or blanks.)
--Mobilization of the rear and political
preparation of the civilian population.
Are
factories being converted from two- to threeshift production?
Are other Warsaw Pact
countries mobilizing?
--A surge in reconnaissance satellites placed into
orbit.
--Movement of additional aircraft to forward
bases.
--Grounding of aircraft and cancellation of
training exercises,
for maintenance and
readiness for coordinated mass operations.
--Sudden growth in naval deployments.
--Change in the volume of radio traffic,
especially in command channels.
--The appearance of special words in dispatches. 11 8
The above means that in order to maintain the element of
surprise, the attackers would have to limit the number of
forces involved and limit the actual preparation for the
attack.

The

Soviet

forces

stationed

near

the

!GB

are

capable of carrying out such an attack particularly since
they have been organized into an effective and autonomous
fighting force,

but they would have to attack alone and

without reinforcements.

Doing so would mean an unfavorable

force-ratio for the invaders.
achieving

absolute

In addition, the chances of

surprise are very remote,

so

NATO's

forward defenses will more than likely move to at least the
minimum level of alert by the time the invasion actually
begins. 119
118

Betts, op. cit., pp. 191-192.

119 Killebrew, op. cit., p. 92; Park, loc. cit.; Betts, op.
cit., p. 207.
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Notwithstanding any major errors in judgment on the
part of NATO commanders,

the surprise attack would more than

likely fail before achieving a significant breakthrough.
NATO forces organized themselves,
come

under

tremendous

interdiction.

For

the

the attacking forces would

pressure
reasons

As

from

air

explained

and

ground

earlier,

the

Soviets would still be largely unmobilized and unable to
either

replace

reinforcements.

their

forward

units

or

provide

The entire attack would become vulnerable

to envelopement from a NATO counterattack.
attack is initiated at nighttime,

Also,

if the

Soviet close air support

would have difficulty being effective, and by daylight hours
the NATO counter-air campaign would be in full operation. 120
The Soviet military is undoubtedly well aware of these
and other weaknesses

in the surprise attack tactic.

It

seems logical to conclude that with all the known weaknesses
of a standing-start surprise attack, the Soviet Union and
the other Warsaw Pact countries are very unlikely to try
it. 121

Surprise

attack

does,

however,

have

some very

attractive qualities, and what is more likely to happen is a
modified version of a surprise attack where Pact countries
fully mobilize and attempt to get such a head start on NATO

120

Killebrew, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

121

Ibid., pp. 93-94.
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that nearly insurmountable advantages will be gained by the
attackers.

The next obvious question then becomes:

what

might lead to a Pact mobilization and, when it occurs, how
fast can and will NATO react to it?
Mobilization and Reinforcement
There are many circumstances that could motivate the
Soviet Union or

the

entire

group

of

Pact

attempt an invasion of NATO territory.
enough

by

themselves

to

motivate

countries

to

Most would not be
a

Pact

invasion.

Nevertheless, a combination of these circumstances (which is
not unimaginable), occurring at relatively the same time,
could make the Soviets feel that the only course of action
to preserve their disintegrating empire would be to initiate
a preemptive strike at NATo. 122

According to Richard Betts,

examples of events or circumstances that could lead to such
a strike include:
--A change in personnel in the Soviet oligarchy.
--The political collapse of NATO and/or the
economic collapse of Pact countries.
--A worsening of relations or war with China.
--A crisis in the Middle East involving both
American and Soviet forces.
--Accidental naval engagement between American and
Soviet fleets.
--The formation of a formal alliance between
China, Japan and the U.S.
--The neutralization of any NATO or Warsaw Pact
country or group of countries.

122

Betts, op. cit., pp. 157-159.
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--Civil war o~ anarchy in any country in East or
West Europe. 123
These preludes to a Pact attack would not happen overnight
and may develop over a period of weeks or even months.

The

existence of nuclear weapons will continue to deter the use
of force, but if a Pact conventional attack does occur it
will

most

likely

be

the

product

of

a

simultaneous

combination of crises like those mentioned above.

In short,

a conventional attack on NATO is most likely to have some
advance

warning.124

How

fast

NATO prepares

impending invasion (mobilizes) will have a major

for

the

impact on

NATO's ability to implement Forward Defense.
The implementation of Forward Defense

is also heavily

dependent on actually acquiring the advance warning of a
Pact attack.

With

the

recent advances

reconnaissance, electronic sensors,

in satellite

and listening posts,

NATO has vastly improved its ability to detect and track
Pact mobilization measures.

These improvements, however,

encourage reliance on advance warning
vulnerability to deception tactics.
example,

the Germans,

and

increase the

In World War II, for

knowing their internal communications

were likely to be monitored by the allies, disguised their
intent to attack in the Battle of the Bulge by transmitting

123

Ibid., pp. 159-161.

124

Ibid., pp. 155 and 158; Killebrew, op. cit., p. 94.
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c~mmanas

to concentrate forces in the area to prepare for

expected allied attacks across the Ruhr River. 125
Even with plenty of advance warning,

the real danger

lies in the political decision to mobilize and reinforce.
All

the

response.

advance

warning

possible cannot authorize

a

NATO leaders would probably find warning of a

Pact attack very hard to believe because of the knowledge
that

the

dangers

for

both

sides

are

so

tremendous.

Disbelief or skepticism on the part of NATO decision makers
need only delay the decision to mobilize and the successful
implementation
jeopardized.

of

Forward

Defense

could

A prime example of this

be

seriously

would be if NATO

leaders decided to delay mobilization in an effort to allow
Soviet "doves" extra time to deescalate the situation. 126
For NATO decision makers to

initiate mobilization and

reinforcement, a Soviet or Pact mobilization would probably
have to be too obvious to ignore.
undoubtedly fear

provoking

Some NATO leaders would

the Soviets unnecessarily until

the actual intent of Soviet actions is known.

Fortunately,

however, a military response to a Pact threat is not limited
to an all-or-nothing mobilization.

Each country with forces

on the IGB is free to mobilize separately and senior NATO
field commanders have some authority to declare an alert
125

Betts, op. cit., pp. 192 and 198-199.

126

Ibid., pp. 157, 197, 199.

74

status for

their forces.

Nevertheless,

beyond military

vigilance, the lowest level of alert, an upgrade to higher
stages of alert,

must have the approval of the NATO DPC.

The levels of alert that are necessary for mobilization and
reinforcement (simple, reinforced and general alert) must
all be approved by the politicians of the DPC.

This means

that full preparedness for a Pact invasion is immensely
dependent on the declaration of maximum alert by the NATO
political

leaders.127

The timing of mobilization and reinforcement is
absolutely critical.

The longer it takes to decide when to

mobilize in the face of a Pact mobilization,

the less time

NATO forces will have to prepare for the onslaught and the
more likely that the defense of Central Europe will not
succeed.
would

A recent study on the subject concluded that it

take close

to a full

week after commencement of

mobilization for NATO forces to make adequate preparations.
This is the amount of time that would be necessary to place
charges

on

obstacles,

bridges,

lay

cut down trees,

mines,

crater

roads,

erect

and prepare the terrain.

The

time needed for preparations stresses the importance of an
early decision to mobilize and reinforce.

If NATO decision

makers fail to invoke mobilization and reinforcement orders

127

Ibid., p. 173; Killebrew, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
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soon after Pact mobilization begins, a Soviet or Pact attack
would have many of the advantages of a bolt-from-the-blue
surprise attack--even if NATO began mobilization before the
attack.

The critical issue is how much of a head start will

Pact forces have in their own mobilization process.
much time elapses,
mobilize,

or

if NATO members are unable to agree to

even

if

some

NATO

immediately and others do not,
able

to

recover

If too

in

time

to

countries

mobilize

NATO probably will not be

restore

force

ratios

to an

acceptable number.128
The

successful

implementation

of

mobilization

is

extremely dependent on a complex series of movements of men
and

materiel

from

the United States

to Central Europe.

Without the benefit of reinforcement from the continental
United States,

it

is unlikely that NATO forces

adequate to prevent enemy breakthroughs for more
short period of time.

will be
than a

The problem is that although the

manpower can be raised within a few days,

it takes much

longer to supply the necessary materiel. 129 Unless they are
properly equipped,

manpower is virtually useless on today's

modern battlefield.

128

Betts, op. cit., pp. 173-174.

129 Ibid., p. 184; James A. Huston, One for All (Newark,
N.J •: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1984), p. 289.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Sml!MARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The

reader

should

now

be

in

a

better

position

to

evaluate the NATO conventional battlefield strategy for
Central
examined.

Europe.

The

In order

strategy

to reinforce

has

been

identified

the preceding

and

discussion,

the following section will summarize the entire study.
In the first chapter,

the purpose of the thesis was

discussed including the several reasons why conventional
defense is extremely important.

In addition, some of the

most significant terms used in the study were identified and
defined.

Chapter

two

discussed

the

evolution

of

NATO,

giving the reader some perspective on its origins and the
diversity of its members.
it

helps

the

Chapter two is important because

reader conceptualize

the political divergence

that has been apparent in the alliance since its inception.
Chapter

three

opened

with

a

recent

example of

conventional defense is increasing in significance.

why
The

chapter continued with an examination of the early NATO
battlefield strategies and the reasons for

their demise.

The second major section of chapter three discussed the main
subject of this thesis--today's NATO battlefield strategy.
Forward Defense was considered in terms of its place in
NATO's doctrine of Flexible

Response

followed

by

an
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extensive elaboration on the methods that will be used to
carry out the strategy.
Chapter four was important because it explored the
factors that make Forward Defense a very viable strategy.
The first section of the chapter examined geographical,
physical and combat factors that add to the advantages of
employing Forward Defense as the strategy for defending
Central Europe.
factors

The final section discussed significant

that could conceivably hinder or

impede the

successful implementation of Forward Defense.
Militar1 and Political Conclusions
The central problem for NATO or any alliance for that
matter is and always has been to find a strategy that is
both politically acceptable to the allies and yet militarily
credible to the opponent.
that test.

Any alliance strategy must meet

When speaking of the conventional defense of

Central Europe,

the strategy of Forward Defense appears to

fulfill both requirements for NATO.

Nevertheless, a careful

examination of the facts reveals both strong and weak points
of NATO's current conventional battlefield strategy.

The

first conclusion that comes to mind concerns the rationale
for basing the strategy on Forward Defense.
The West Germans are entirely justified in insisting on
Forward Defense for the NATO battlefield strategy.

Within
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100 kilometers of the IGB lies:

1) almost a third of West

Germany's total population, 2) 25 percent of the West German
industrial capacity

(one

of

the

most

important

in

the

world), and 3) the city of Frankfurt, which is one of the
most vital NATO communication links and military depots. 1 30
The German people could hardly be expected to support any
strategy

that

would call

for

giving

up

that

100 km of

territory for the sake of gaining some tirne--hoping that
North American reinforcements will arrive soon.
must

also

realize

all

too

well

that

territory is likely to become permanent.

any

The Germans
sacrifice

Since West Germany

is absolutely essential to the success of the alliance,
strategy contrary

to West German

politically impossible to adopt.

interests would

In addition,

considerations such as the terrain at the IGB,
space ratios,

of

any
be

military
force-to-

attrition rates and other factors all combine

to make NATO's defensive strategy very viable.

Therefore,

one can conclude that the rationale for adopting Forward
Defense is both militarily and politically justified.
Although the rationale for Forward Defense is sound,
the strategy does have some significant weaknesses.

These

include problems with logistics during mobilization and
reinforcement, and the tremendous dependence the strategy

130

Mako, op. cit., p. 32.
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places on prompt political decision-making.

Either of these

weaknesses could be enough to defeat the strategy.
It is difficult to imagine a successful conventional
defense

of

Central

Europe

without

reinforcements from North America.
logistics

of

transporting

massive

the

benefit

of

At the same time, the
amounts

of

men

and

materiel across the Atlantic is one of the most difficult
and

complicated

reinforcement

tasks

process

that
in

can

war-time

be

undertaken.

conditions

would

The
be

vulnerable to many different hazards ranging from enemy
naval and air interdiction to civilian sabotage as well as
simple scheduling foul-ups.

Even without enemy interference

the task would be difficult,
schedule.

especially on a tight time

The key to successful defense is the amount of

time given for

the mobilization process before hostilities

actually commence.

The amount of time, however,

is also

subject to a second major weakness--the political decisionmaking process.
The political decision-making process is handicapped by
the necessity to accommodate the perceptions of 16 different
countries--a relatively large number for any decision-making
exercise.

Since NATO decisions must emerge from a consensus

of all its members, and since many of the members would be
expected to have different perceptions of the best course of
action to take in the face of an increasingly serious Pact
threat,

it is reasonable to conclude that in all likelihood
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the decision to mobilize will be delayed considerably.

The

longer it takes for NATO to decide to mobilize in the face
of a Pact invasion,
thwart the attack.

the less likely

it

will be able

to

Unless mobilization is initiated shortly

after Pact mobilization is indicated, the defense of Central
Europe will fail.
The weaknesses of Forward Defense are significant,
it appears that the strengths outweigh them.

but

If it is true

that no other strategy is politically acceptable, then the
critics of Forward Defense are wasting their time.

This

fact is particularly born out when one considers all of the
factors that make the strategy the most likely to succeed
militarily.
made.

That is not to say that improvements cannot be

One of the most obvious, for example, would be to

make better use of the current time of peace to construct
more and better barriers and obstacles near the IGB.

If

political approval could be achieved, this suggestion should
prove to be relatively inexpensive and extremely beneficial
to the successful implementation of Forward Defense.

The

main obstacle to this suggestion is the German hope and
belief that the two Germanies will eventually be reunited.
Construction of barriers and/or obstacles is seen by the
Germans

as

a

permanent

separate German countries.

sign

of

acceptance

of

the

two
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Undoubtedly there are many more
realized.

improvements to be

If the critics of Forward Defense were to turn

their attention toward finding more ways to improve the
implementation of the strategy rather than trying to find an
alternative to it,
be enhanced.

over all deterrence would most assuredly

That is the purpose of a viable and strong

conventional defense in the first place--to be strong enough
to

deter

an

aggressor

from

even attempting

a

military

attack.
Understanding the complexities of an issue facilitates
informed debate and a
facts.
the

more

thorough examination of the

It is hoped that th is study will make it easier for

reader

to comprehend

the

complexities

of

the

NATO

alliance and especially the NATO conventional battlefield
strategy.

In addition to promoting a better

of NATO conventional defense,

understanding

it is also hoped that this

study will stimulate future research and thinking about this
important and rapidly changing subject.
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